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Abstract
During the transition to capitalism, the postcommunist countries have experienced
unprecedented mortality crises, although there has been considerable variation within —
and between — countries and regions. Much of this variation remains unexplained,
although alcohol and psychological stress have been found to be major causes of
declining life expectancy. We move beyond this finding by showing that the
implementation of neoliberal-inspired rapid large-scale privatization programs (mass
privatization) was a major determinant of the decline in life expectancy. We find that
mass privatization also increased alcohol-related deaths, heart disease, and suicide rates,
strong evidence that mass privatization created psychosocial stress that directly resulted
in higher mortality. We also find that mass privatization modestly contributed to a decline
in the number of physicians, dentists, and hospital beds per capita; however, we find only
very weak evidence that this reduction in health resources directly contributed to the
mortality crisis itself. By using “control function” and instrumental variable approaches
to account for the potential endogeneity of mass privatization, we also demonstrate that
the choice of mass privatization as a property-reform strategy was not economically
determined, but was rather caused by ethnic politics and the mimicking of policies
adopted by powerful neighboring countries.
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We have a fearful example in Russia today of the evils of insane and unnecessary haste.
The sacrifices and losses of transition will be vastly greater if the pace is forced ….
-

John Maynard Keynes, “National Self-Sufficiency,” Yale Review, 1933

[W]henever serious readjustments take place in the social order, whether or not due to a
sudden growth or to an unexpected catastrophe, men are more inclined to self
destruction.
- Émile Durkheim, “Suicide,” 1970

I am deeply convinced that the success of our policy in all spheres of life is closely linked
to the solution of our most acute demographic problems. We cannot reconcile ourselves
to the fact that the life expectancy of Russian women is nearly 10 years and of men nearly
16 years shorter than in Western Europe.
- Vladimir Putin, State-of-the-Nation Address, April 25, 2005

3
Introduction
The massive economic contraction that followed the disintegration of the Soviet
system has attracted a great deal of attention. What has been relatively neglected,
unfortunately, is the most troubling aspect of the transition to postcommunism, the
explosive rise in “violent mortality,” or epidemic levels of cardiovascular disease and
“external” causes of death such as alcohol poisoning, homicide, and suicide (World Bank
2005, Brainerd and Cutler 2005, Gavrilova et al. 2000). Countries in the “mortality belt,”
spanning from Estonia in the north to Ukraine in the south, experienced life-expectancy
declines of up to six years within the first half-decade of reform — a peacetime mortality
crisis unparalleled in modern history. 2 The United Nations’ TransMONEE project
tabulates that the excess mortality during the 1990s, or deaths that would not have
occurred if mortality had remained at 1989 levels, totaled over 3.2 million (UNICEF
2001). (See Figure 1 and Tables 1 and 2.)
While the generalized economic crisis that has been labeled the “postcommunist
recession” could logically be expected to relate to this increased mortality, it can at best
be considered only a partial explanation, since the mortality has not followed the typical
patterns of development and health. During the initial stages of reform, from 1989 to
1994, there is a moderately strong correlation between the logarithmic change in gross
domestic product per capita and the logarithmic change in life expectancy (r=-0.60).
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Eliminating all common forms of cancer roughly corresponds to a life-expectancy

increase of three years, a little less than half of the magnitude of Russia’s decline (Swiss
Re 2004).
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Over the next six years, however, the unadjusted relationship weakens considerably (r=0.13). Several countries, including Russia, exhibit the anomalous experience of declining
mortality in the midst of economic recovery (World Bank 2005). Another enigmatic
aspect of the excess deaths has been the disproportionate impact on working-age men,
rather than vulnerable groups such as the very young and elderly, whose health has
historically borne the brunt of rapid economic destabilization. Infant mortality levels in
Russia, aside from an immediate and transient spike following the onset of radical market
reforms in 1992, have steadily declined against a background of “epidemic” levels of
chronic disease. (see Figure 2)
The social sciences (sociology, political science, economics) have been relatively
silent about this human crisis, focusing instead on patterns of elite and social
stratification, political outcomes, and economic development and change. A major
exception to this neglect has been the group of “global ethnographers” studying the living
conditions of the population (e.g., the contributors to Burawoy and Verdery 1999 and
Burawoy et al. 2000). Although these ethnographers do not explicitly address the publichealth crisis, they do link adverse social outcomes implicated in contributing to the
erosion of population health, such as the emergence of poverty, to organizational failure,
which is usually traced back to the destructive effects of the adoption of “neoliberal
ideology” on state capacity (see Field, Kotz and Buhkman 2000 for a holistic account of
the public-health crisis, which supports a “state desertion” account).
Western neoliberal economists were the most influential advisors to the
postcommunist policy makers, while domestic neoliberal economists served as crucial
political elites directly shaping postcommunist economic policy (see the seminal work by
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Wedel 2001 and Kogut and Spicer 2005). And yet neoliberals have had very little to say
about the mortality crisis, and indeed believe it to be the most puzzling outcome of the
transition (e.g., Shleifer and Treisman 2004). They expected that the enactment of the
correct (i.e., neoliberal) reforms would push countries forward on the linear path from
“planned” to “advanced market economies” 3 and thus increase economic growth and
prosperity. The lengthening of life expectancy should follow suit (Sachs 1996; Pritchett
and Summers 1996) as countries undergo an “epidemiological transition,” typical of
modernizing societies, in which neonatal care, modern sanitation infrastructures, and
vaccines generate a decline in disease and thus a lengthening of life expectancy (Omran
1971; WHO 2003).
Not surprisingly, the public-health field has most directly and extensively studied
this crisis. Epidemiologic analyses clearly show that the increase in mortality is due to a
rise in cardiovascular disease and “external causes” like alcohol poisoning, violent
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This economic ontology is made explicit by the European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development (a daughter bank of the World Bank [the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development] and the institution most responsible for oversight of
the transition), which releases yearly reports and updates (Transition Reports) that serve
as the major source of data for most social scientists studying the region. These reports
code all economic policies on a 1-4-point scale, with 1 corresponding to a “planned”
economy and 4 to a “market” economy. A score of 4* was given to policies that
approximated what was found in the advanced market-economies; this has subsequently
turned into a 4.3.
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deaths, homicide, suicide, and accidents. Psychosocial stress levels and alcohol
consumption have occupied central roles in these explanations. Yet even in the most
comprehensive analyses a sizable residual remains unaccounted for.
We will advance a sociological theory of postcommunist mortality, building on the
work of the global ethnographers but using quantitative methods. This analysis
complements the public-health literature, but it poses a major challenge to neoliberal
transition theory. Our findings demonstrate that those countries that implemented the
neoliberals’ preferred method of privatization (mass privatization) experienced
substantial declines in life expectancy. This explains a large part of the postcommunist
mortality crisis, although the magnitude of the effect and the variance explained is
sensitive to the type of statistical test employed. Our most conservative estimate of the
decrease in overall life expectancy as a result of implementing a mass-privatization
program is 0.86 years; the highest estimate is 5.14 years. We control for endogeneity
related to the selection of mass-privatization programs and heterogeneity of the program
effect using several instrumental and control methods, and find that the results remain
consistent. We find it difficult to escape the conclusion that rapid large-scale
privatization as embodied in mass-privatization programs was a significant anterior cause
of the postcommunist mortality crisis via the mechanism of psychosocial stress.
This paper has five sections. In the first, we review the findings from the publichealth research. In the second we discuss the neoliberal analysis and develop a “new
classical sociological” theory of postcommunist mortality that supplements the publichealth account. We then generate our hypotheses. In the third we discuss our methods
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and data. In the fourth we present our results, and in the conclusion we discuss the
implications for public policy and future research.

Public Health Literature on the Postcommunist Mortality Crisis.
It is well established that the postcommunist mortality crisis was primarily driven
by so-called “violent mortality”: cardiovascular disease and external causes of death such
as alcohol poisoning, accidents, homicide, and suicide, especially among working-age
adult males (Cornia and Paniccia 2000). Public-health researchers have long understood
that there is a strong relationship between low socioeconomic status and poor health
(Kosa 1969, Marmot and Wilkinson 1999). Thus, a declining economy should lead to
worse health as it lowers living conditions. And indeed, over the entire period from 1989
to 2000, across 22 transition countries, the log of life expectancy and the log of GDP
growth have a -.55 correlation coefficient, although the relationship holds most strongly
in the first five years (-.60) and is rather weak thereafter (-.13) (Brainerd and Cutler
2005). Clearly, the economic decline had some important effect, but the size of the
effect, and the mechanisms that are operative, are not obvious.
Logically, a collapsed medical-care system, unable to provide preventive
medicine or to adequately treat the ill, could account for this rise in mortality (Field, Kotz
and Bukman 2000). Prior to the transition, the state (and state-owned enterprises, or
SOEs) bore the brunt of the financial burden of health by universally providing free
access to centrally planned care (Balabanova et al. 2004). Although the principle of
universality persists, the advent of market reforms in the context of the health sector
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levied higher costs on patients at the time when many were the least able to afford them
(Balabanova et al. 2004; Brainerd and Cutler 2005, p. 48).
The marketization of health care, combined with a growing lack of purchasing
power among the poor, could account for increased mortality. Reiss et al. (1996) report,
for example, that many patients in St. Petersburg simply could no longer afford the
cardiovascular medicines they needed, and, as a result, access to care was suddenly
abridged for patients with histories of chronic conditions and for patients who were
newly diagnosed with illness. Surveys from eight postcommunist countries found that
over one in five persons who reported an illness did not visit a doctor even though they
felt it was medically necessary (ranging from roughly 10% in Armenia to 50% in
Georgia) (Balabanova et al. 2004).
However, as plausible as this account is, we are aware of no systematic research
(at either the national level of Russia or cross-nationally) that supports this position as a
primary determinant of the mortality crises, and it does not easily explain the precipitous
rise in “violent” causes of death. Stegmayr et al. (2000) show that in Novosibirsk the
increased mortality from strokes was not due to higher fatality rates (which would follow
if the cause was poor health care) but simply from a higher number of strokes. Using
maternity fatality rates as a measure of the quality of health care, Brainerd and Cutler
(2005) fail to find a significant relationship between log changes in maternal mortality
and log changes in working-age (ages 25 to 64) male mortality in 22 postcommunist
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countries. 4 They also fail to demonstrate a significant relationship between public and
private health-care spending levels and male working-age death rates (p. 12).
The Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) also shows that the
traditional risk factors for cardiovascular disease (behavioral risks such as smoking,
alcohol consumption, and having an unhealthy lifestyle/diet and clinical risks such as
hypertension and high cholesterol), generally estimated to account for 40% to 60 % of all
chronic-disease experience, surprisingly explain only a small fraction of the rise in
mortality in Russia. Of these, only alcohol consumption changed enough to
independently explain surging mortality levels. Furthermore, the RLMS did not show an
increase in underweight people (with weight determined by the Body Mass Index),
suggesting that an inability to get enough food is not to blame (Brainerd and Cutler 2004,
pp. 13-15). This finding is consonant with Dore, Adair and Popkin (2003)’s study that
shows that Russian households are able to maintain nutritional levels despite changing
economic conditions. This resilience is likely a function of the recourse to informal
agriculture as a coping strategy (Southworth forthcoming) and intra-family gift-giving
(Burawoy et al. 2000).

4

As previously noted, infant mortality levels experienced a downward tendency,

suggesting sufficient levels of pre- and neonatal care. Maternal fatalities may be a weak
proxy for care related to the emerging conditions that more heavily relied upon
pharmaceuticals, diagnoses, medical procedures, or other areas in which the health
system was radically restructured.
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It might be the case that, while caloric consumption is maintained, securing
enough food requires more work, or displaces resources required for other basic needs,
like utilities, shelter, and water. Using the RLMS data for Russia, Brainerd and Cutler
(2005) include a number of controls for such circumstances (such as whether a family
was in poverty or extreme poverty, received subsidies for fuel, had to sell goods to obtain
food, and what the share was of all expenses devoted to food), but fail to find significant
effects.
Still, while postcommunist households may have maintained sufficient caloric
intake, dietary content may have undergone important changes (i.e., a “nutrition
transition”; see Popkin 2002). Several studies suggest that the economic transition
affected the composition of diet in ways that would influence health outcomes. In most
Soviet-style systems meat and dairy products were heavily subsidized, while fruit and
vegetables were hard to come by. Thus, the removal of subsidies could increase the price
of meat and dairy, and the liberalization of trade increase the supply of affordable fruit
and vegetables, leading to a predictable shift in food-consumption patterns, with
corresponding mortality effects (insofar as fatty meat and dairy have adverse health
effects relative to the consumption of fruits and vegetables). Bobak et al. (1997) show
that average Czech butter consumption fell from 9.4 kg. to 5.4 kg. from 1989 to 1992,
while Poledne and Skodova (2000) show that the average Czech increased consumption
of fruits and vegetables from 68 to 86 kg. from 1989 to 1997. Sekula et al. (1997)
showed a similar change in Poland between 1989 and 1994, where there was a decrease
in the consumption of animal fat and an increase in the consumption of vegetable fat.
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Changes in the availability and prices of different types of food (based on
variation in exchange rates and inflation rates) might therefore account for changing
mortality rates. In a cross-country regression using WHO mortality data on the
availability of fruits and vegetables per person in kilograms, Brainerd and Cutler (2005,
p. 49) show that an increase in such availability corresponds to decreased mortality, but
the effect is not statistically significant, and explains a modest 3% of the changing
mortality of working-age men. This matches their results obtained within Russia using
RLMS data — decreasing fruit-and-vegetable consumption increases cardiovascular
death, but this explains only 2% of the increase in such diseases (p. 22).
The most significant positive findings from the public-health literature focus on
increased levels of psychosocial stress and the related increase in alcohol consumption
and other risky “coping” behaviors. Stress (the anxiety/fear caused by a person’s
perception of a challenge and the perceived inability to meet those challenges [Sokolov
1963, Ursin 1988, Ursin and Levine 1991]) has long been recognized as being associated
with cardiovascular disease (Labarthe 1998). The stress response is necessary for all life
to respond to various stimuli in the environment, but damage to health comes when stress
levels are maintained for long periods of time (Ursin and Levine 1991), because the body
can not adequately recover normal levels of the hormone cortisol. Elevated cortisol
levels have been linked to impaired cognitive performance, suppressed thyroid function,
blood-sugar imbalances, decreased bone density and muscle tissue, higher blood
pressure, suppressed immunity, and increased stomach fat (which in turn is linked to a
variety of cardiovascular diseases). Thus, multiple mechanisms have been found by
which psychological and social stressors “get under the skin” to affect a wide range of
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pathologies (Kristenson et al. 2004).
Such stress, in addition to killing through other types of “violent mortality,” may
also reasonably be assumed to be a cause of some of the massive increase in the suicide
rate in the postcommunist world. To examine the mortality impact of psychosocial stress
levels, Brainerd and Cutler proxy male suicide for overall stress. In a cross-sectional
regression, the male-suicide rate has a substantively large and statistically significant
effect on the increase in male mortality from 1989 to 2000 across 22 transition countries
(the coefficient is .274, and this variable explains 28.7% of the variance [Brainerd and
Cutler 2004, p. 49]). If a significant portion of this stress results from an acute fear of a
major decline in living standards, then the minimum-wage level might also serve as a
decent proxy for this type of stress (amplifying this is the fact that minimum-wage levels
are often used as a benchmark for setting the value of various social benefits). Brainerd
and Cutler (2005, p. 116) show that the log change in the minimum wage as a percentage
of hourly wage has a large negative effect (-9.8%) on mortality in 18 transition countries.
Stress can, of course, lead to poor health through an increase in “risky” behavior,
such as using alcohol or drugs as a coping mechanism. Such behavior would also be
influenced by the price and availability of such goods, which would in turn be influenced
by liberalization policies (or the effect on imports of such goods from currency
fluctuation and inflation). For example, the relative price of alcohol plunged in Russia
from 1990 to 1994 by 58% (Brainerd and Cutler 2005, p. 17), a result of a flood of cheap
imports and low-quality black-market vodka. Increasing alcohol consumption contributes
to mortality by increasing levels of alcohol poisoning and by contributing to suicides,
accidents, and violent deaths. Furthermore, binge drinking may contribute to
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cardiovascular disease via increasing arrhythmias and heart attacks (McKee and Britton
1998). And there is ample evidence of an increase in alcohol in Russia. The RLMS data
indicates that alcohol consumption increased by 27% from 1992 to 2000. Official
statistics on per-capita alcohol consumption show large increases cross-nationally in the
Baltics and the European Former Soviet Union (FSU), but only a slight change in many
countries in central and southern Europe.
There is evidence that this increased consumption is indeed partially responsible
for the mortality crisis. A detailed study of cardiovascular disease and drinking in men in
Novosibirsk from 1985 to 1994 showed that heavy drinkers experienced increased health
problems. But the authors find that the level of heavy drinking is too low to account for
the increase in cardiovascular disease, and, even if it is underestimated by a factor of 5 on
surveys, it could account for only 8% of such deaths (Malyutina et al. 2001; Malyutina et
al. 2002). Cross-national regression in 22 transition countries reveals a large, statistically
significant effect of increased alcohol consumption on mortality, suggesting that it
explains about 25% of the increased mortality between 1989 and 2000. Regression
analysis of the RLMS data from 2000 to 2002 (when it recorded cause of death) shows
that the increase in alcohol consumption in Russia predicts an increase in male mortality
from accidental deaths. Each 1% increase in consumption increases the likelihood of
dying by 0.4%, which, if one controls for binge drinking (defined as someone who
reports normal consumption in the last 30 days as 120 or more grams of hard alcohol),
falls to 0.3%; binge drinking, however, makes one 362% more likely to die an accidental
death.
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Taken together, the major findings of the public-health literature are that an
increase in stress and an increase in alcohol consumption have had a prominent effect on
the postcommunist mortality crisis, but that these factors leave a large amount of variance
between countries and variance within countries over time unexplained. The gigantic
question this begs is what explains variation in stress and risky behavior both over time
and between countries.
There is evidence that suggests that “transition” policies may have precipitated or
contributed to the mortality crises (Ellman 1994). One study found that mortality
increases within Russia were greatest in regions that experienced the fastest pace of
transition in terms of job gains and losses in large and medium enterprises (Walberg et al.
1998). Unemployment levels, which did not exist under communist regimes, soared in
the wake of social reform. In the Soviet-style economies, employers historically played
an important role in ensuring well-being through dispensing various social and consumer
goods in the workplace (literally, in enterprise-owned organizations that may or may not
have been located at the factory) and quite often housing as well. The sudden loss of
these benefits could be particularly traumatic for workers. Indeed, evidence finds that
many workers continued to work even in the absence of fiscal remuneration to maintain
access to these goods (Service 2003, Southworth 2004). Other studies point to the impact
of asset stripping and reprofiling of health-delivery institutions, such as pharmacies,
under privatization programs (Cornia and Paniccia 2000). We provide a first attempt to
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operationalize these policies by investigating the effect of implementing large-scale
privatization programs on mortality. 5

Neoliberal Economics and New Classical Sociological Theories of Postcommunist
Health Outcomes
A small group of neoliberal economists with ties to Harvard provided the
intellectual guidance (policy advice) and legitimation (intellectual/political support) for
transition policy makers (Kogut and Spicer 2005). To our knowledge, they have mostly
ignored the mortality crisis, and focused instead on explaining variation in rates of annual
growth throughout the region.
These economists argued that radical liberalization, stabilization, and privatization
programs were necessary for both economic and political reasons. They have
subsequently produced a substantial amount of literature that indicates that the closer the
adherence to their initial policy advice is (usually measured by the de Melo et al. [1996]
composite indictor of “liberalization”), the better the economic performance as measured
by annual growth rates (see King and Hamm 2005 for a literature review). Neoliberals
expected that the transition from the planned to the market economy would catalyze the
“epidemiologic transition” found in Western societies, in which modernization leads to
declines in overall mortality and a decrease in its variability until it reaches a low and

5

Other studies attempt to quantify implementation of structural reform using 1) The de

Melo liberalization index, and 2) the EBRD reform index. See King and Hamm (2005)
for the pronounced limitations of these indexes.

16
stable level (Omran 1971). Sachs (1996) theorized that “liberalization” would lead to
increases in life expectancy, while Prichett and Summers (1996) believed it would lead to
lowered infant mortality rates and longer life expectancy.
Neoliberals have never suggested that actually implementing their prescribed
policies might have contributed to the public-health crisis, and in fact offer no structural
account of the mortality crisis at all. They ultimately resort to will-based, or
voluntaristic, explanations of the mortality crisis: poor health is related to poor personal
choices. Therefore, their policy advice is that individuals must decide to make better
choices and take better care of themselves, perhaps aided by educational campaigns. A
recent study conducted by the World Bank on the Russian mortality crisis concluded that
“Russians must ease back on the bottle, cut down on smoking, watch their diet and lead
healthier lives if they are to reverse population decline and maintain economic growth.”
Though the report referred to Russians’ legendary fondness for vodka, it also cited
excessive smoking, poor diet, and low personal fitness as contributory factors (Reuters,
Moscow, Dec. 8, 2005).
We consider this a non-explanation. It begs the following question: Why did people
all over the postcommunist world start making worse personal choices, and why much
more so in some countries rather than others? Such decisions could in no sense be
considered “rational” in the medium or long term, so why did people decide to start
discounting the future so heavily? There must have been a change in people’s
environment to trigger this behavior. Individual preferences, willpower, or genetics
cannot account for the changing mortality patterns over time. We seek an answer to these
questions by providing a sociological analysis of the effects of the most contested of all
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transition policies, mass or “shock” privatization (King 2003).
Sociology has made substantial contributions to understanding postcommunist
poverty through extensive case studies and survey research, but for the most part
sociologists have directly addressed declining life expectancy. Our new classical
sociological account is not mutually exclusive with the public-health literature. We wish
to add to the explanation by seeking to identify the anterior cause of psychosocial stress.
We add in privatization policy as an additional explanation of the mortality crisis,
opening up a whole new set of independent variables (macro- and microeconomic [i.e.
structural adjustment] policies) for explaining public health and demographic change in
the postcommunist world.
Neoliberal-neoclassical economics (building on the classics of Smith and
Ricardo) fundamentally disagrees with what we term “new classical sociology” (building
on the classics of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim) about the relationship between the state,
the market, and civil society. The neoliberals famously see the state and the market in a
zero-sum way, in which the more state there is, the less market there is. Civil society
(defined as having social groups with shared values and symbols) is conflated with the
market. The neoclassical sociological position sees the state, the market, and civil society
as mutually constitutive (Block and Evans 2005, Chibber 2004, Linz and Stepan 1996,
Zeitlin 1984, and Reno 1998). Here, civil society refers to groups with “social closure”
(class and status groups) (Parkin 1979) as well as a community’s shared understandings
of the world.
The artificial creation of “private property” overnight, when a class of
entrepreneurial capitalists has not emerged over time, will not produce the desired effects
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because it neglects the role of “civil society” (a profit-oriented entrepreneurial class) and
a strong bureaucratic state in the proper functioning of “Western” or “modern” capitalism
(these can be considered the Marx and Weber effects). Moreover, to the extent that
traditional social-prestige hierarchies are disrupted and many people’s traditional
understanding of themselves in relation to society is undermined by radical institutional
change, we can expect an intensification of social problems (the Durkheim effect).
Our initial causal model identifies supply-and-demand shocks from massprivatization programs that undermine economic organizations, producing a decline in
the economy’s activity and a rise in barter, which both lead to declining state revenues,
producing a decline in state capacity. The state can no longer supply the elements
necessary for medium- and hi-tech production (see Hall and Soskice 2001), including
skilled labor, which creates a vicious circle of declining enterprises and a failing state
(King and Hamm 2005, King 2002, King 2003, King and Szelenyi 2004). The
generalized organizational failure resulting from these processes increases physical and
emotional stress for all involved, and diminishes the organizational strength of caregiving institutions. These two social facts combine to increase mortality. (See Figure 3).
We thus generate the main hypothesis we will test in this paper.
H1SOC: All things held equal, countries that implemented mass-privatization
programs will have had greater declines in life expectancy than countries that
didn’t implement such programs.
Neoliberals would predict the opposite, even if there was a lag between the policy and the
positive effect while resources were reallocating.
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H1NL: All things held equal, countries that implemented mass-privatization
programs, possibly after a brief lag of time, will have a greater increase in life
expectancy than countries that didn’t implement such programs.
We will test the robustness of the basic finding with several additional dependent
variables. Because men were disproportionately employed in the heavy industrial sector
(Fodor 2003, Einhorn 1993) that makes up a disproportionate number of the large
enterprises that were included in mass-privatization programs, we would expect men to
suffer from more psychosocial stress than women. We look at the difference between
male and female changes in life expectancy as one test for robustness. Thus, contingent
on H1SOC being supported, we test:
H2SOC: All things held equal, mass-privatization programs will have a larger
negative effect on male life expectancy than female life expectancy.
To further test for the robustness of our psychosocial stress mechanism, we compare the
effect of mass privatization on the rate of two causes of death which we can reasonably
assume are to a significant extent the result of increased psychosocial stress: alcoholrelated deaths and suicides. As a final variable to test for the psychosocial stress
mechanism, we add ischemic heart disease (IHD) or coronary artery disease, which has
been shown to be related to anger and socio-emotional distress [e.g. Koskenvuo et al.
1988, Siegrist 1990, Chang et al. 2002].
H3ASOC: All things held equal, countries that implemented mass-privatization
programs will have higher increases in the rates of alcohol-related deaths, suicide,
and ischemic heart disease than countries that didn’t implement such programs,
and;
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H3BSOC: The increase in these rates will be greater for men than for women.
Our initial “new classical sociological” explanation for the postcommunist collapse
emphasizes that the economic crisis that contributes to the psychosocial stress will also
undermine state capacity, and thus medical provision, further contributing to the
mortality crisis. In the analysis we use a variety of measures of health provision (percapita number of physicians, nurses, dentists, hospital beds, and inpatient admissions.
Thus we generate additional hypotheses.
H4ASOC: All things held equal, countries that implemented mass-privatization
programs will have declining health provision (hospital beds, physicians, nurses,
dentists, inpatient admissions), and
H4BSOC This decrease in health provision will increase mortality.
Definitions and descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Appendix 1.

Data and Methods
We construct a panel using the January 2005 mortality data from the WHO
Mortality Database and the January 2006 European Health for All Mortality Database for
26 transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltics, Russia, and
other members of the Former Soviet Union. 6 Economic and social variables are derived
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2005), the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Transition Report (2003), the TransMONEE
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The panel is unbalanced because not all data for the regressors are available in the same

years.
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database (2003), and the World Bank/EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (1999). Econometric analyses are conducted using LimDep version
8.0 and Stata version 9.
The validity and reliability of health surveillance during transition could be a
possible limitation for analyses of the mortality crisis. More specifically, there are
concerns about shifts in mortality stemming from the development of new monitoring
and detection methods, as well as inaccurate or mis-classification of death resulting from
the transformation of health systems. Such unobserved relationships or measurement
errors may obscure the relationship between health outcomes and privatization programs.
Some countries, such as Georgia, implemented fees for death registration, which has led
to high levels of underreporting. Countries that adopted these types of market-driven
health-care-delivery reforms also tended to be the ones that more greatly embraced the
free-market model (Baburashvili et al. 2001), hence inclusion of these countries in our
analysis may conservatively bias the results of mass privatization on health outcomes.
While the proportion of deaths with undefined causes escalated, at the peak of the health
decline between 1991 and 1994, to approximately 3%, we assume that this categorization
is random across causes of deaths, and will not qualitatively skew results.
Overall, the consensus from scholars is that despite these limitations the data
during reform periods are sufficiently valid and reliable to permit empirical analyses for
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comparative purposes (Brainerd and Cutler 2005, Baburashvili et al. 2001). 7 Indeed,
mortality data is far more reliable for comparative analysis than all macroeconomic data
(see Filer and Hanousek 2001).

Modeling Framework
Our analysis follows a ‘quasi-natural experiment’ approach, which has been
strongly advocated by statisticians as well as economists for evaluating the effects of
policy interventions (Angrist and Krueger 2002, Freedman 1999). The key advantage
claimed by this approach is that country participation can be treated as independent, such
that outcome differentials across these strata can be directly attributed to the policy.
Mass privatization seems to be a promising candidate for this framework, particularly
since the reform itself was intended to operate as an ‘economic shock,’ rapidly inducing
the formation of a capitalist class (Gerry and Li 2002).
The quasi-natural experimental design does have some notable limitations. The
independence assumption that underlies evaluation of the treatment effect of the policy
may not be unbiased if policy changes are driven by politicians’ and stakeholders’
motives in ways that relate to health outcomes. Although recent comparative studies by
economists have assumed privatization and its different methods of implementation to be

7

In Russia from 1992 to 1995, for example, over 94% of deaths have been medically

certified, while background cancer mortality expressed temporal stability, an indicator of
internal consistency (Gavrilova 1997).

23
exogenous policy choices (e.g. Bennett et al. 2004), we will conclude our analysis by
carefully assessing potential sources of endogeneity.

Fixed vs. Random Effects
To specify the appropriate modeling approach with panel data, we need to decide
between the more efficient random-effects model and the more conservative fixed-effects
model. The question is whether there are unmeasured unit (country) effects that are
correlated with the explanatory variables and the outcome variables. We formally test
this assumption using the Hausman-Test 8 , which essentially compares the predicted
parameters under random effects and fixed effects. We find that the unobserved
heterogeneity cannot be assumed to be unrelated to the predictors of health outcomes (χ2
= 44.27, p<0.001). Therefore, fixed effects is preferable, because it removes this
heterogeneity altogether by explicitly allowing it to freely correlate with the explanatory
variables (such that α can be any function of x). In essence, this is like putting in a set of
country-dummy variables (Davidson and Mackinnon 1993). While the random-effects
model explains variance caused by differences between countries over time and
differences within countries over time, the fixed-effects model only explains withincountry variation. As a result, differences in changes in life expectancy that arise from
differences between countries are excluded from the analysis. This allows us to isolate
the effect of our policy variable (mass privatization) without worrying about differences

8

Hausman ~ χ2(k) where k = # of predictors.

Hausman = (β̂FEM - β̂REM)′ [Var(β̂FEM) - Var(β̂REM)]-1 (β̂FEM - β̂REM)
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between countries that might impact changes in public health. Fixed-effects estimation is
also less efficient than random effects, as it loses degrees of freedom; since this makes it
more difficult to have a strong and statistically significant result, we thus have a more
conservative estimate.

Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity

Testing our data for nonconstant variance with the Breusch-Pagan method
indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity. We also find evidence of first-order
autocorrelation in our panel. To account for these distortions, we estimate an AR(1)
model and use White’s robust-covariance matrix to produce asymptotically consistent
parameters and corrected standard errors. Jackknife standard errors are also used to test
the model’s robustness to potential outliers.

Endogenous Selection Bias and Heterogeneity of Treatment Effect

Initial conditions may influence the propensity of countries to select among
various reform strategies to facilitate the transition to capitalism. We wish to rule out the
possibility that the decision to implement a mass-privatization program may not be
exogenous (i.e., there are factors that caused countries to implement mass-privatization
programs that would have led to a decline in life expectancy regardless of the
privatization policy adopted). Moreover, there are likely to be country- or region-specific
factors that confound the relationship between mass privatization and health outcomes.
Without explicit adjustment for the unobservable factors that confound the relationship
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between mass privatization and health outcomes, the estimates of the treatment effect
may be biased due to endogeneity.
There are several well-established statistical methods that can be employed to
account for endogenous selection bias (e.g., matching, instrumentation, and statistical
adjustments). Following the recent burst of popularity for selection models in the
political science and development economics literatures, it seems straightforward to adapt
a “Heckman-type” selection model (Heckman 1979) or “control function” (Heckman and
Navarro 2004) to the problem of selection bias; by means of this a selection equation and
an outcome equation are jointly estimated, assuming a bivariate normal error term in the
two equations, to cope with bias resulting from selection on unobservables (Przeworski
and Vreeland 2000, Navia and Zweifel 2003, Vreeland 2003). We acknowledge that this
strategy has been critiqued for sensitivity to the model specification, problems with
collinearity, and reliance on distributional assumptions in cases where independent
variables for selection and the outcome equation are the same (Sartori 2003, Winship and
Mare 1992). For these reasons, we agree with Winship and Mare that “Heckman’s
method is no panacea for selection problems and, when its assumptions are not met, may
yield misleading results” (1992). Choosing to attack the selection problems statistically
may account for them without shedding much light on them.
We construct a first-stage model to carefully study the factors that predispose
countries to deploy mass privatization. These observed and unobserved influences are
then injected into a selection parameter (λ), which is explicitly conditioned on a second
stage to abrogate potential selection bias as well as some heterogeneity. On the basis of
these findings, we also develop instruments which can independently predict mass
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privatization without directly impacting life expectancy, allowing us to correct for
selection effects using the Heckit method as well as two-stage least squares.

Health Production Function

Our main specification follows the standard health-production model, along the
lines of Schultz (1993). The theory that underlies this model is based on the concept of
the individual-specific health production function in Grossman (1972) and advanced on
by Anand and Chen (1996):

(1) Hit = ƒ(Qit, Dit, HCit, Nit, Zit, Vit, Sit);

Where Qit is a vector of macroeconomic variables; D is a vector of demographic
characteristics; HCit is non-health human capital; Nit is a vector of dietary and nutritional
inputs; Zit is a vector of medical resources; Vit is a vector of environmental conditions;
and Sit is a vector of individual country characteristics.
We obtain a basic model that depends on policy variables and a set of social and
economic determinants:
(2) LEit = α + β1 MPRIVit + β2LIBit + β3 GDPit + β4URBANit + β5EDUCit + β6DEPit +
Β7FERTit + θλit + εit
Where i denotes country and t time; MPRIV is coded as a 0 for years preceding
mass privatization and 1 for years following the implementation of mass privatization.
(We define a mass-privatization program as a reform that transferred the ownership of at
least 25% of large state-owned enterprises to the private sector by relying on citizen
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vouchers and giveaways to firm insiders. 9 ) This coding is taken from the text of the
historical narratives for each country in the EBRD’s 1996 and 1999 Transition Reports. 10
LIB is the EBRD’s 1 to 4.3 scale of price liberalization; GDP is the log of per-capita
GDP in constant US$; URBAN is the percentage of the population living in urban
settings. Urbanization is included as a broad indicator of macro-development 11 ; EDUC is
used to assess the educational components of human capital using tertiary enrollment
rates; DEP is the dependency ratio (the fraction of the population composed of elderly
persons and children); FERT is the fertility rate in expected births per woman; and λ is
the selectivity coefficient calculated by the Inverse Mills Ratio. 12 The selection
coefficient λ can also help to better understand the direction in which the bias occurs (if it
occurs), such that θ>0 would indicate that the countries which undertook mass

9

Data for the rates of privatization are not available from the World Bank or the EBRD.

10

“Large” is defined for each country by the EBRD and generally refers to firms with

greater than 500 employees.
11

Urban settings often correspond to greater access to health resources and nutritional

input, but have been associated with increased risk for chronic diseases, including
cardiovascular diseases, malignant neoplasms, and diabetes (Yach et al. 2004). Recent
studies have found that rural patients in postcommunist settings are less likely to receive
care, which is unsurprising given a larger health literature that shows differential access
to health resources and services in rural relative to urban settings (Balabanova 2004).
12

⎧ φ/Φ ; if priv = 1
Inverse Mills Ratio = ⎨
⎩- φ/1 - Φ; if priv = 0
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privatization had factors that also positively influenced their health experience, and as
such would have been on a better health trajectory absent mass privatization. 13
To assess the mechanism by which mass privatization affects mortality, in
subsequent models we introduce controls for behavioral risks and nutrition (alcohol
consumption per capita, protein and fruit-and-vegetable availability per capita) and
measures of health- system resources (number of physicians, nurses, hospital beds, and
dentists per capita and hospital-bed occupancy rates) as measures of health-system
resources. We test the psychosocial-stress mechanism by stratifying the analysis by
gender and regressing violent-mortality health indicators on the basic model in addition
to life expectancy. We also estimate finite distributed lag models to analyze the effects of
mass privatization over time. In appendix 3 we include a dynamic model using a lagged
dependent variable to assess and to adjust for state dependence (that is, we include life
expectancy in the previous year as a control variable).

Main Results

The result of the basic equation using fixed effects with adjustment for first-order
autocorrelation is presented in Table 3. Mass privatization is estimated to lower overall
13

Applying the fixed-effects transformation to (1) yields the estimated basic model:

(2)

(LEit – LE i)= β1(MPRIVit – MPRIV i )+ β2(LIBit – LIB i) + β3(GDPit – GDP i)+
β4(URBANit – URBAN i) + β5(EDUCit – EDUC i) + β6(DEPit – DEP i) +
β7(FERTit – FERT i) + θ(λit – λ i) + (αi – α i) + (μit – μ i) ;
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life expectancy by 0.86 years. Time dummies for each year, not presented, did not
significantly modify the direction or magnitude of the covariates, indicating that the
results were not artifacts of the turbulent transition period. Other covariance matrices,
calculated using either White’s robust covariance matrix or Jackknife standard errors, do
not modify the significance of these findings. And when dynamic effects are taken into
account the results also remain consistent. 14
The impact of GDP per capita on health is, similar to previous cross-country empirical
findings, positive, by which an order of magnitude increase in GDP per capita
corresponds to a 1.4-year increase in life expectancy. By this measure, the “break-even”
point for the health benefits resulting from increased economic performance to offset
adverse effects of mass privatization would require a 4.2-fold increase in GDP. Of
course, no transition country has grown anywhere near this much. Moreover, simple
cross-sectional regression analysis shows that mass-privatization programs exert a large
negative effect on the overall rate of growth (about 46%), which would further contribute
to declining population health levels (King and Hamm 2005). (See Table 3.)
In Table 4 we adjust for a broad set of additional control variables to determine whether

14

Finite distributed lag models find that the significant negative effect of mass

privatization takes place in the first two years, and that the effect never turns positive, as
might be expected from the neoliberal model. Appendix 3 presents a “dynamically
complete” version of the basic equation, using lags of life expectancy and mass
privatization.
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changes in health-care resources, dietary elements, and other policy variables contributed
to the mortality crisis and could alternatively explain (or have mediated) the relationship
between mass privatization and mortality. We find that the number of physicians, nurses,
hospital beds, and inpatient-care admissions scaled to population size neither have the
expected statistically significant effect on life expectancy nor significantly change the
coefficient on mass privatization. (See Table 4)
The only finding that may indicate that shrinking health-care capacity is
contributing to life-expectancy trends is the positive effect of the greater number of
dentists. During periods of economic flux, dentists, substituting for surgeons, may play a
more prominent role in ensuring population health (for example, due to the diverse nature
of dentists’ abilities, many military establishments favor the enlistment of dentists over
physicians). Another interpretation of this finding may relate to the migration experience
of dentists relative to physicians. The period of transition was marked by high levels of
cross-country migration, particularly for the specialist classes. The promise of better
compensation under market-driven health-financing reforms may have lured dentists
away from countries with bleaker economic outlooks, whereas physicians may have had
less opportunity to benefit from emigration. The positive effect of dentists on life
expectancy therefore may indicate that countries which retained dentists fared better
socially and economically during transition than others, possibly accounting for the
observed effect in a manner unrelated to health-care delivery. At any rate, one
statistically significant effect out of five indicators is not very strong — and is moving
dangerously close to being indistinguishable from a result of chance.

31
Table 4 also assesses the effect of dietary and nutritional health inputs on the
cross-country mortality experiences, and shows that these controls do not affect the main
finding. Only alcohol consumption had the expected direction, with an increase in
alcohol consumption of one liter per capita decreasing life expectancy by 0.12 years. The
results from the other variables, measuring availability rather than consumption directly,
are counterintuitive, suggesting that increases in both the availability of fruits and
vegetables and the percentage of total energy derived from protein decrease life
expectancy. Overall caloric intake was not significant.
A major limitation to the nutritional factors is that during the transition period
availability certainly increased following price and trade liberalization, while
consumption may well have decreased for a substantial part of the population (i.e., the
shelves were finally full but most of the people could no longer afford to buy the
goods). 15 In addition, the data doesn’t distinguish between an increase in potatoes and
more nutritious fruits and vegetables. Thus the negative effect of fruits and vegetables
could be due to the increased reliance on the produce of dacha garden plots, a non-market
response to increased hardship (Southworth 2005, King 2003).
Lastly, Table 4 examines the impact of other transition policies on health
outcomes. Adding the widely used de Melo liberalization index (which produces a single
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A one point, higher categorization of price liberalization (on the 1-4.3 scale), using the

main model specification, increased the availability of fruits and vegetables by roughly
six kilograms, whereas privatization did not have a significant effect. Neither price
liberalization nor mass privatization shaped the availability of protein.
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summary value for all transition reforms, including privatization, with a 0 for “planned”
economies and a 1 for “market” economies) indicates a strongly negative effect of 2.10
years. Since the de Melo index was only produced until 1997, the number of
observations is reduced to 159, with 25 out of the 26 sample countries covered. The
effect of mass privatization, which is slightly but not significantly attenuated, plus the de
Melo index, is gigantic – roughly 2.8 years. Inclusion of the EBRD’s foreign-exchange
and trade-liberalization index (1 – 4.3) is non-significant and does not change the results.
Finally, the Heritage Foundation’s Political Freedom index (positively coded from 1 to 7)
demonstrates that increasing political freedom has a positive effect of 0.21 years on life
expectancy in a manner that leaves the basic finding unaffected.
Thus, if we can rule out health resources and nutritional changes as mechanisms linking
mass privatization and decreased life expectancy, we are left with psychosocial stress.
We do a series of tests of the robustness of this explanation. First, since men were
disproportionately employed in the big enterprises subjected to mass privatization, we
would expect a bigger effect on men than women. As can be seen in Table 5, mass
privatization knocks 1.99 years off of male life expectancy, far more than the 0.7 years
for women (Models 1 and 2). Urbanization exerts a strongly negative effect on life
expectancy (-0.5), but only for men. Fertility also exhibits a larger effect on men,
roughly four-fold higher than the non-significant effect on women. Fertility declined in
nearly all of the postcommunist countries, in some plummeting to dangerously low subreplacement levels, with profound demographic implications. Using the main
specification to regress fertility on mass privatization roughly suggests that mass
privatization suppressed fertility by -0.20 births per woman (results not shown). This
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follows a rich body of literature that finds fertility to be determined by a panoply of social
and economic factors (Schultz 1969), primarily those that shape a household’s desired
number of children. Since the mortality effects of fertility are only prominent among
men, we think that fertility is absorbing some of the effects of psychosocial stress, but the
nature of these effects is not yet clear. There remains a need to assess the institutional
determinants of fertility change (Easterlin 1985). (See Table 5.)
Models 3 and 4 demonstrate the increase in alcohol-related mortality causes of
death (unintentional alcohol poisoning, liver cirrhosis, etc.) associated with the main
covariates. As with life expectancy, there are marked differences across gender. Massprivatization programs increased rates of alcohol-related mortality causes by 41 per
100,000 in males, but only 6.68 in females — approximately a six-fold difference. These
results are similar in magnitude to the health-promoting effect of a 10-fold increase in
GDP. We find the same patterns of findings for fertility and urbanization as in Models 1
and 2. Higher education levels significantly decrease alcohol mortality, but only among
females.
For suicide and intentional causes of death (Models 5 and 6), mass privatization
explains an increase of 5 suicides per 100,000 people for men, quite large given the rare
nature of a suicide. 16 For a rough comparison, in the United States in 1996 suicide
claimed the lives of 10.8 males per 100,000 population members (U.S. Public Health
Service 1999). The effect for women is only 0.25, and it is not statistically significant.
Models 7 and 8 compare ischaemic heart disease across gender. The results follow the
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Brainerd and Cutler (2005a) use suicide as an indicator of psychosocial stress.
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pattern observed in previous models: the effect on both genders is statistically significant
and large, but is three times larger for men.
Of the covariates, it is noteworthy that the direction of the effect of fertility
reverses, corresponding to decreases in male suicide. This may relate to the psychosocial
benefits of family size in the face of economic stress, possibly indicating a role for
fertility experience as a coping mechanism for men. Increased levels of education also
appear to buffer against suicide risk and ischaemic heart disease — and this effect holds
for women as well, although the effect is much smaller. This variable may capture the
ability of people with higher education to find new, better jobs in the private sector. (See
Table 6.)
Finally, we turn to the effects of mass privatization on the supply of health care,
even though we have already seen that we have only very weak evidence of the decline in
health services having a statistically significant impact on the rise in mortality. We can
see from Table 6, in Models 9 to 13, which regress health-resource indicators on the basic
equation, that there exist modest but statistically significant negative effects on the
number of physicians per 1,000 people (-0.15), dentists per 100,000 people (-3.92), and
hospital beds per 100,000 people (-0.72) — roughly 10% declines from the mean country
values in the panel.
Returning to our hypotheses, we fail to reject H1SOC (“All things held equal,
countries that implemented mass-privatization programs will have had greater declines in
life expectancy than countries that didn’t implement such programs”) and reject H1NL:,
the neoliberal alternative (“All things held equal, countries that implemented mass-
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privatization programs, possibly after a brief lag of time, will have a greater increase in
life expectancy than countries that didn’t implement such programs”).
We also find strong evidence in favor of accepting H2SOC (“All things held equal,
mass-privatization programs will have a larger negative effect on male life expectancy
than female life expectancy”) and H3a (“All things held equal, countries that implemented
mass-privatization programs will have higher increases in the rates of alcohol-related
deaths, suicide, and ischemic heart disease than countries that didn’t implement such
programs”), and H3b (“The increase in these rates will be greater for men than for
women”).
We find slight evidence on H4a, in which “All things held equal, countries that
implemented mass-privatization programs will have declining health provision (hospital
beds, physicians, nurses, dentists, public-health spending, inpatient admissions).” We
have a modest negative effect on the availability of physicians, dentists, and hospital beds
per capita.
Most surprisingly, we find only very weak evidence for H4b, in which “This
decrease in health provision will increase mortality.” Only 1 of 5 indicators (number of
dentists) had a statistically significant effect, and this might be picking up differential
opportunities for emigration.
We must use caution when interpreting this final negative result. It might be the
case that informal networks are able to compensate for the reduction in health resources
somehow (see Burawoy et al. 2000). It might be a problem in measuring health resources
in the chaotic and highly informalized postcommunist economies that results in this weak
finding. It also might well be that even if “civil society” has somehow been able to
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mitigate the effects of declining official resources, this does not mean it will be able to do
so in the future. Russia, for example, faces multiple looming epidemics in HIV and drugresistant tuberculosis, that will necessitate substantially more resources to address once
they reach fruition (Harvard Medical School and Open Society Institute 2001). 17

Endogeneity

The major objection to our findings, and one immediately raised by most
economists, is the problem of endogeneity. That is, there might be some set of conditions
(such as a terrible political and economic crisis) that both causes the adoption of massprivatization policies and would have caused the postcommunist mortality crisis anyway.
Perhaps the countries that are the very worst off to begin with, facing the greatest
economic challenges with the least going for them, adopt mass privatization as a measure
of desperation. If this is the case, it is plausible that the statistical estimations of the
effects of mass privatization on life expectancy are spurious, since life expectancy was
going to fall in those countries no matter what policy was adopted.
We can address this problem statistically. 18 Table 7 presents the results of a first-stage
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The Russian government will have to spend some of its massive windfall in oil

revenues (which it is currently [as of June 2006] stockpiling) to deal with this. It is hard
to see where resource-poor transition countries will find similar resources.
18

It could be addressed historically for each case with a detailed political analysis that

carefully constructs plausible counterfactuals. We believe that in Russia such an analysis
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probit model predicting mass privatization, along with a model with marginal effects
estimated at mean levels of the explanatory variables, and a linear-probability model
(with and without fixed effects) to facilitate interpretation. According to the linearprobability model, the biggest determinant of implementing a mass-privatization program
is being a member of the Former Soviet Union (such countries were roughly 79% more
likely to implement such a program). We think this demonstrates a large “policy
diffusion” effect, or “mimetic isomorphism.” That is, countries looked to the policies of
powerful neighbors when formulating policies. There are other important determinants as
well. (See Tables 7 and 8.)
The relative size of the second-biggest ethnic group is a highly significant
predictor of privatization experience. The data is divided into three groups, so that each
third (~20% difference) increases the chance of implementing a mass-privatization
program by about 23% to 28%. 19 What we think is happening is that newly independent
political elites of the FSU use mass privatization to remove the ethnically Russian
population, which immigrated to the “near abroad” to fill positions in new industries.
Thus, the elites of the new countries that emerged from the disintegration of the Soviet
Union could have used mass-privatization policies as a vehicle to remove the Russian
managers in charge of large industrial enterprises that were established by Soviet

would clearly show that alternatives to mass privatization were quite possible, but this is
well beyond the scope of this paper.
19

Large disparities between the probit models (calculated at mean x-values) and the

linear- probability model may suggest important non-linear effects.
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industrialization. 20 Therefore, the bigger the ethnic minority, the greater the chance that
mass privatization will be employed.
Countries that introduced price liberalization (measured on the EBRD’s 1 - 4.3
point scale) were more likely to implement mass-privatization programs by 16% for each
point. Presumably, this represents a general neoliberal ideology on the part of
policymakers. Levels of external debt, long-standing debt, IMF credit, and IMF-credit-toexternal-debt ratios did not enter significantly into the model of mass privatization. In
the fixed-effects framework, a ten-fold increase in IMF credit was associated with an
increased likelihood of privatization of 1% — a modest effect. The dummy for Central
Europe and the Baltics is slightly positive but not significant; we think this may indicate a
preference for FDI (King 2001, King and Szelenyi 2004).
Several demographic variables were also predictive. Higher levels of fertility
corresponded to lower probabilities of mass privatization. To the extent that fertility
proxies for each country’s stage in the demographic transition, these findings suggest that
less advanced countries (i.e., those with higher fertility) were also less likely to rapidly
privatize SOEs as a reform strategy. This fits our theory, as our mechanism, ethnic
political competition, only becomes salient where there was a large inflow of ethnic
Russians, which was a by-product of Soviet-led industrialization. Tertiary education also
decreased the likelihood of mass privatization, such that each percentage point of higher
education reduces the likelihood of implementing a mass-privatization program by 1%.
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Within Russia, we think, a similar process occurred, as mass privatization was used to

oust managers loyal to the all-Soviet side (Kogut and Spicer 2005).
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This could be capturing a large specialist/expert class, which might favor privatization,
via management and employee buyouts or via FDI, over mass privatization (King 2001,
King and Szelenyi 2004). 21
Using each cross-sectional observation to predict the likelihood of a country
having adopted a mass-privatization program correctly predicts 87% of the actual
outcomes (Table 8).

21

To do the selection models, we had to include all of the covariates from the equations

regressing mass privatization on life expectancy. This yields some statistically
significant predictors that have no substantive interpretation. For example, a ten-fold
increase in GDP would increase the odds of implementing a mass-privatization program
by 8%. Urbanization and fertility rates have coefficients that indicate they decrease the
chance of implementing such a program, but we don’t think these results are necessarily
interpretable.
A major caveat is that causality can not be fully ascertained because of the
temporality limitations. However, it is reasonable to infer that relatively fixed historical
factors, such as ethnic nationality, preceded rather than followed mass-privatization
programs. Price liberalization and other covariates, alternatively, cannot be distinguished
in our framework as to having preceded or having been preceded by mass privatization,
which potentially gives rise to a spurious association. It is important to include these
covariates, however, so that the second-stage model nests these terms to avoid misspecification issues. (See Table 9.)
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Tests of these variables for validity as instruments indicate that the size of the
second-largest ethnicity, membership in the Former Soviet Union, and the log
transformation of IMF credit levels fit the criteria for mass privatization (i.e., it is
associated with mass privatization but not associated with life expectancy except through
observables). 22 Using these instruments, we can get unbiased estimates by comparing
outcomes across these dimensions, holding fixed unobservable influences on mass
privatization.
Table 9 investigates potential exogeneity with a two-stage, least-squares approach
to instrument for mass privatization with the variables used in the first-stage probit model
to predict mass privatization. The mechanics of the two-stage model function to replace
mass privatization with fitted values based on the first-stage estimation, in order to assess
the treatment effect freed from potential unobserved endogeneity in the second stage.
The results indicate a larger effect than predicted by the fixed-effect model (-1.17 years),
although the difference is not significant, suggesting that the endogeneity may not be a
prominent concern for mass privatization. GDP levels per capita, however, fall from
significance in this model, which departs from the established positive relationship in the
literature, strengthening the case for relying on the fixed-effects models.

22

Test for instruments, Cov(zit,dit) ≠ 0; i.e., instrument z correlated with treatment d, and

second, Cov (zit,єit) = 0 instrument z must be uncorrelated with heterogeneity in
outcomes. If these conditions are satisfied then the IV is consistent.
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We also use the Heckit method to account for endogeneity by constructing a new
variable (λ), which combines the predictors of mass privatization rather than directly
transferring predicted values of mass privatization into the main equation. Similar to the
2SLS model, the Heckit method allows us to hold constant the factors that may have both
caused the “worst” countries to adopt mass privatization and would have contributed to
their downward health trajectory in any case, potentially providing a more accurate
interpretation of the program impact. This approach has the added benefit of permitting
us to characterize the direction of the bias caused by the unobserved factors.
Table 9 presents the results of the selection models under three frameworks:
treatment effects, which does not take the panel structure of the data into account and is
thus essentially a pooled OLS model containing the added selection variable from the
probit model; random effects; and fixed effects. In all of the models, as with the 2SLS
estimator, the effect of mass privatization is magnified; in other words, any evidence of
endogeneity indicates that the countries that were better off from a health-promoting
perspective were more likely to have adopted mass privatization as a reform strategy.
The selection coefficient θ is not significant for the fixed-effect model, suggesting that
the factors that predisposed countries to differentially adopt mass-privatization programs
were relatively time-invariant and that either fixed-effect or differencing models
annihilate this bias.
Let us summarize the interpretation of the selection models. The method of
privatization tends to be “politically” rather than “economically” determined. In fact, the
biggest factor in explaining intra-FSU variation is ethno-national structure, which is
historically determined. Mostly, the adoption of mass privatization was affected by the
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timing and extent of industrialization. Those regions that were industrialized under the
Soviet Union had a large ethnic Russian population that staffed many of the specialist
occupations of the new enterprises. Thus, the countries that mass privatized were also
likely to be the more industrialized ones. More industrialized countries should have had
fewer very poor people, and thus we would expect that any given economic shock would
have been less likely to push people below some (socially understood) basic level of
consumption to maintain good health. They would also have a more highly educated
labor force, and were thus more likely to have the professional expertise to implement
improved public health measures (e.g., the presence of Russian-educated doctors in the
universal Soviet- sponsored health-care system). Thus, our analysis suggests that to the
extent by which countries that mass privatized differed from countries that did not mass
privatize, this difference suppresses the effect of mass privatization on mortality.

Conclusion

Our primary findings are quite clear and robust, showing that the implementation
of mass-privatization policies substantially decreases life expectancy via the mechanism
of psychosocial stress, and that these policies account for the unique patterns of violent
mortality and explain part of the distribution of mortality experiences across gender. This
analysis goes beyond the existing understanding of both the public-health literature and
the economics literature — that the postcommunist mortality crisis can be explained by
unhealthy and risky lifestyles (especially drinking) as well as psychological stress
(Brainerd and Cutler 2005) — by identifying one of the policies that induced this stress.
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The peculiarity of the transition, that working-age men, rather than the weakest
and poorest (the aged and small children), were disproportionately hit by the rise in
violent mortality, is explained by our model. We find it likely that the dangerous
behavior identified in the public-health literature is related to a psychological state (be it
alienation, anomie, disenchantment, or some combination of these) that is related to the
destruction of people’s understanding of their place in the world. The psychological
trauma confronted by a middle-aged skilled worker, previously part of the relatively
privileged backbone of the socialist economy and now the useless relic of a defeated
system, was enormous. Our findings indicate that for many it was literally a killer.
Mass privatization goes a long way toward explaining the mortality differences
between Central Eastern Europe and the “mortality belt” in the FSU. Only the Czech
Republic implemented a large enough mass-privatization program to count by our
operationalization, but even this program was far smaller in scale and scope than the
Russian version. Importantly, the best quantitative (Hanousek et al. 2004; Kocenda and
Svejnar 2002) and qualitative (McDermott 2002) evidence shows that mass-privatized
firms had worse performance than other enterprises. It is likely that the Czech Republic’s
extremely low unemployment rate and the provision of social-democratic welfare
benefits (see Rutland 1992/3) mitigated the increase in stress associated with mass
privatization. 23

23

Poland had a much smaller program (covering about 10% of industry) that only

included small and medium enterprises. Its implementation was delayed for several years
by worker resistance, and it was enacted only in 1995. Here, too, it is important that
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An alternative explanation for our findings would be that mass privatization
proxies for the implementation of radical policy reforms more generally, and that it is not
mass privatization per se that directly impacts life expectancy. Future work needs to
operationalize the other transition policies and assess their individual and combined
effects on life expectancy, as well as whether the sequence of these reforms is important.
We wish to stress that these are just a set of first findings relating economic policies to
demographic outcomes. Much more work needs to be done. This includes expanding the
list of policies to include price, trade, and foreign-exchange liberalization, as well as
stabilization programs. 24 We believe this will explain even more of the variation in
mortality patterns in the postcommunist world, such as the spike in Russian mortality
following the 1998 default and devaluation. 25 If the mechanism is economically induced
psychosocial stress, these other policies should have effects similar to those of mass
privatization. We also need better data on spending on public health care. As noted

enterprises privatized in this way seemed to have very poor performance as well (see the
case study and statistical evidence summarized in King and Sznajder 2006).
24

Current EBRD indexes used in this analysis are imperfect, as they build in bureaucratic

and economic success and also do not reliably indicate the same programs in different
countries (see King and Hamm 2005).
25

This was a result of the IMF condition of funding government spending with special

super-high-yield government-backed bonds rather than resorting to deficit spending,
which created a huge financial pyramid on top of a crumbling real economy, combined
with current account convertability.
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above, we are not comfortable dismissing the hypothesis that declining support for health
care is related to the mortality crisis (as Brainerd and Cutler [2005] find).
Finally, since there is always a potential for ecologic fallacy in macro-level
analysis, we also believe much more definitive results could be obtained by getting more
fine-grained data — ideally, data at the individual level. Only then will we be able to see
what is occurring at the level of mechanisms.
Still, we feel our findings are sufficient to pose a gigantic problem for the
neoliberal political economy of privatization, which claims that more and faster
privatization (as long as it’s not to workers with a legal device to centralize their shares!)
is always better. Even if Bennett et al. (2004) are correct 26 , and it could be shown that
mass-privatization policies are economically beneficial, the human catastrophe would not
be worth the price (at least according to most traditional and modern value systems). Of

26

We believe their analysis is incorrect because of the way they code mass privatization.

They separate countries into full-privatizers (i.e., via auction), mass-privatizers, and
mixed systems. This is problematic because all countries that implemented mass
privatization were in fact mixed. It is also extremely vague. We have a much more simple
way to interpret coding that measures the extent of mass-privatization programs. While a
variable that measures the rate of mass privatization would be ideal, that data is not
available from the World Bank or the EBRD, and cannot be constructed from the
EBRD’s 1 - 4.3 scale of large-scale privatization (see King and Hamm 2005). We are
currently exploring ways to construct such a rate variable. We analyze the growth effects
of mass privatization in another analysis (King and Hamm 2005).
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course, none of the countries that adopted mass privatization have, to date, achieved
anything close to sufficient GDP gains to offset the negative effects on public health. 27
Moreover, studies have found that poor public health decreases the value of human
capital, and thus future economic growth. The World Bank and the World Health
Organization estimate that the cumulative losses from increased mortality in Russia from
2005 to 2015 will amount to U.S. $303.2 billion, or 5% of GDP (World Bank 2005).
There is an urgent moral and economic need to understand in greater detail the causal
effects of macroeconomic and microeconomic reforms on public health.
The most obvious policy implication is that reforms must not aim to shatter the
existing organizational base of the economy, but should instead build on existing
institutions. This does not necessarily mean slower reforms, for simple management and
employee buyouts in which the non-managerial employees have a legal device (an
Employee Share Ownership Program, or ESOP) to centralize their shares can be even
faster than mass-privatization programs (Ellerman 2003). Such reforms, by giving the de

facto ownership rights of employees de jure status, have the massive economic benefit of
eliminating the principle-agent problems that devastated so many postcommunist firms
(see Ellerman 2003).
Class formation cannot be infinitely “telescoped.” Policymakers should allow for
rapid transfer to firm insiders (with protection from predatory outsiders) to improve
incentives, but this will be practical mainly in small and medium firms. For industrial

27

Only three out of the 26 postcommunist countries proper have any experienced net

growth from the time of the transition up to 2005.
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giants too large to be controlled in this way, and on which many additional firms and
indeed industries will be dependent, a superior method would be to restructure during
prolonged state ownership, prior to privatization by strategic investors (when this benefits
the firm), with due consideration of state revenues (this is the predominant Polish way to
privatize large enterprises [King and Sznajder 2006]). In some cases, this may mean
maintaining state ownership indefinitely, and in some cases forging joint ventures
between SOEs and multi-national corporations (as seen in China).
The neoliberals’ political prediction — that delays in large-scale privatization will
result in lack of “transition progress” or even a reversal of reforms — has been shown to
be false. Both Poland and Slovenia greatly delayed large-scale privatization, but have not
suffered economically or ended up any less “Western.” In fact, they have the highest
overall growth rates in the postcommunist world (excluding East Asia). Furthermore, the
expected “anti-reform” coalition of managers and workers did not emerge. Ironically, by
increasing stress to catastrophic levels, mass privatization is likely to do substantially
more harm than good for the long-term prospects of capitalism in the region. Mass
privatization is not the second- or third-best way to privatize, as key members of the
World Bank thought [Kogut and Spicer 2005]); it is very likely the second-worst way, the
worst being to directly transfer the nation’s most valuable enterprises to cronies in a
flagrantly corrupt manner in exchange for political support (as in Russia’s infamous
“Loans for Shares” program).
When disruptive economic reforms are deemed necessary, they must be
accompanied by social policies that shield the population’s health from associated
shocks, as in, for example, Finland and Cuba. The Finnish economy was hugely reliant
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on trade with the Soviet Union, and the collapse of the Soviet economy was therefore
experienced as a massive exogenous economic shock. However, an inclusive social
policy was able to detach developments in mortality entirely from the health of the
economy (Jantti et al. 2000). Similarly, Cuba suffered enormous external supply-anddemand shocks from the collapse of the Soviet Union (and the intensification of the U.S.
economic-sanction regime), and yet its health-care system was able to handle this and
avoided a mortality crisis. Cardiovascular disease showed no spike during this period,
and actually improved (see Cooper et al. 2006).
Some might question where the revenue for these programs would come from.
But arguing that these policies are too expensive merely delays the expense. The
economic consequences of the public-health crisis will be paid eventually; delaying the
implementation of inclusive social policies means that they’ll be paid for in lives in
addition to money. If the predicted epidemic of drug-resistant strains of TB and other
diseases comes to fruition, and if it is globalized, the cost to the world will be
exponentially higher still.
Therefore, it would be appropriate for the Bretton Woods global institutions (the
IMF and WB), whose role in the global economy is now eliciting furious calls for a
fundamental reconstruction from both the left and right (Woods 2006), to consider
making non-conditional grants for such social programs in countries in need of economic
reform.
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Table 1. Age-adjusted death rates for selected causes of violent mortality in Russia
before and after mass privatization (per 100,000).

Cause of Death

1991
Male
47.7
19.4
22.8

Suicide
Accidental poisoning by alcohol
Injury (undetermined whether
accidentally or purposely inflicted)
Homicide
25.1
Accidental drowning and submersion
16.3
Accidents caused by mechanical
4.6
suffocation
Accidental falls
7.8
Accidents caused by fire and flames
5.3
All other accidental causes
24.6
Source: Adapted from Gavrilova, et al 2000.

1994
Female Male
11.2
76.9
4.2
61.2
5.7
60.3

Δ
Female Male
13.6
29.2
15.8
41.8
14.3
37.5

Female
2.4
11.6
8.6

6.9
2.5
1.2

52.8
21.9
11.4

13.6
3.4
2.4

27.7
5.6
6.8

6.7
0.9
1.2

3.6
2.4
6.0

11.1
9.8
45.0

3.9
3.9
11.6

3.3
4.5
20.4

0.3
1.5
5.6
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Table 2. Mass Privatization and Life Expectancy by Country and Region
Region

Country

Balkans

Georgia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Lithuania
Estonia
Latvia
Kyrgyz
Republic
Uzbekistan
Kazakhstan
Turkmenistan
Tajikistan
Czech
Republic
Slovenia
Slovakia
Poland
Hungary
Russia
Ukraine
Belarus
Romania
Bulgaria
Bosnia
Macedonia
Croatia
Albania
Moldova

Baltics

Central Asia

Central Eastern
Europe

Former Soviet Union

SEE

Total ∆
Difference of Avg. LE
Average LE Difference1

Mass
Privatization
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Year

1995
1994
1993
1994
1994

No
Yes
No
No
Yes

1994
1994

No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

1992
1995
1995
1994

Avg. ∆ Privatization
Avg. ∆ Non-Privatization
∆ Privatization – ∆NonPrivatization
Avg LE Privatization – Avg LE
NonPrivatization

Life Expectancy
Change (1989-2002)ω
1.04 / 1.43%
2.81 / 3.89%
-5.11 / -7.35%
1.29 / 1.83%
1.71 / 2.46%
1.53 / 2.21%
-3.52 / -5.14%

-2.50
-6.66
-1.25
-3.99
3.50

/ -3.61%
/ -9.79%
/ -1.90%
/ -5.68%
/ 4.88%

0.94 / 3.73%
2.73 / 1.30%
3.55 / 5.00%
3.09 / 4.44%
-3.57 / -5.16%
-0.59 / -0.86%
-2.20 / -3.13%
0.56 / 0.80%
0.31 / 0.44%
0.96 / 1.31%
1.60 / 2.22%
1.80 / 2.50%
1.85 / 2.56%
-0.55 / -0.81%
-0.38 / -0.61%
+0.23 / 0.36%
-0.61 / -0.97%
-0.90

Sources: World Development Indicators 2005 and EBRD 1992 and 1996 Transition
Reports. ω – when available, otherwise longest difference available; 1 – includes data from
all periods, equivalent to the unadjusted estimate of life expectancy (LE) on mass
privatization; Correlation coefficients: RLE=-0.29, RLEmale=-0.33, RLEfemale=-0.20.
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Table 3. Effect of Mass Privatization on Life
Expectancy in Transition Countries
Covariates
Mass Privatization
GDP
Urbanization
Dependency
Fertility
Price Liberalization
Education
Number of Observations
Number of Countries
R2

Fixed Effects
-0.86 (0.22)**
1.38 (0.24)**
-0.00 (0.07)
0.15 (0.04)**
-0.77 (0.32)*
-0.02 (0.11)
0.07 (0.01)**
313
26
0.93

Note: Hausman Test χ2 = 44.27, p<0.001, favors FEM;
Constant not reported; One-way fixed effects with
country-specific effects presented, period effects do not
alter results; Prais-Winsten transformation used to
calculate AR(1) error structure; Mass Privatization
significant at p<0.05 using either White robust
covariance matrix or Jackknife estimated standard
errors(deleting one group with iterations for each of 26
countries to obtain averaged estimates of the pseudovariances). Other robustness checks (not presented)
remove potential outliers, such as Russia and
Kazakhstan, from the analysis and generate consistent
results; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 4. Control Variables
Control Variables

Coefficient of
Control

Coefficient of
Mass Privatization

Health Resources
Physicians (per 1,000)
Nurses (per 100,000)
Dentists (per 100,000)
Hospital Beds
Bed Occupancy Rate
Inpatient Care

0.10 (0.23)
0.00 (0.00)
0.04 (0.01)**
-0.10 (0.08)
-0.02 (0.01)*
0.01 (0.04)

-0.87 (0.24)**
-0.89 (0.23)**
-0.67 (0.22)**
-0.96 (0.24)**
-0.93 (0.30)**
-0.88 (0.23)**

Dietary & Nutritional Inputs
Fruits & Vegetables
Protein
Energy Availability (kcal)
Alcohol Consumption

-0.01 (0.00)**
-0.16 (0.10)
0.00 (0.00)
-0.12 (0.05)*

-0.69 (0.25)**
-0.98 (0.23)**
-0.85 (0.22)**
-0.80 (0.24)**

Policy Variables
De Melo Liberalization
-2.10 (0.75)**
-0.71 (0.22)**
Index
EBRD Foreign Exchange &
-0.17 (0.10)
-0.69 (0.26)**
Trade Liberalization
Political Freedom
0.21 (0.08)**
-0.98 (0.22)**
Note: Fixed effects model adjusted for log(GDP), EBRD price
liberalization index, percentage of population urban, age-dependency
ratio, fertility rate, and percentage population with tertiary education;
Prais-Winsten transformation to accommodate AR(1) error structure;
* = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 5. Effect of Mass Privatization on Violent Mortality in Transition Countries, By Gender and Disease†
Covariates

Models 1 & 2
Life Expectancy
Male
Female

Models 3 & 4
Alcohol-Related
Male
Female

Models 5 & 6
Suicide
Male
Female

Models 7 & 8
Heart Disease
Male
Female

Mass Privatization

-1.99**
(0.33)

-0.70**
(0.25)

41.19**
(11.78)

6.68**
(2.56)

5.29**
(1.08)

0.25
(0.25)

20.49**
(4.33)

7.24**
(1.54)

GDP

1.98**
(0.36)

1.16**
(0.28)

-42.16**
(13.26)

-10.74**
(2.88)

-3.97**
(1.16)

-0.30
(0.27)

-37.54**
(4.63)

-10.54**
(1.65)

Urbanization

-0.51**
(0.11)

-0.04
(0.08)

13.22**
(3.63)

0.02
(0.79)

1.43**
(0.34)

0.08
(0.08)

11.67**
(1.35)

3.67**
(0.48)

Dependency

-0.01
(0.06)

0.08
(0.05)

-2.46
(2.08)

-0.41
(0.45)

0.29
(0.19)

0.02
(0.04)

-1.29
(0.75)

-0.24
(0.27)

-1.65**
(0.59)

-0.44
(0.45)

42.42*
(17.68)

7.66*
(3.84)

-4.61*
(1.66)

0.07
(0.38)

10.77*
(6.62)

3.94
(2.35)

Price Liberalization

0.18
(0.17)

0.02
(0.13)

-14.42*
(5.99)

-2.26
(1.30)

1.45
(0.56)

0.04
(0.13)

-1.55*
(2.23)

-0.57
(0.79)

Education

0.04**
(0.02)

0.06**
(0.01)

-0.94
(0.49)

-0.38**
(0.11)

-0.26**
(0.05)

-0.07**
(0.01)

-1.01**
(0.18)

-0.25**
(0.07)

Fertility

Number of countries
25
24
25
25
(N)
Number of observations
235
275
297
297
(NxT)
R2
0.93
0.91
0.86
0.92
0.97
0.95
0.93
0.93
Note: Models 6-11 report Mortality Rates per 100,000 population; Constant not reported; Fixed Effects with country
effects presented, period effects do not alter results; Prais-Winsten transformation used to accommodate AR(1) error
structure; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 6. Effect of Mass Privatization on Health Resources
Covariates

Model 9:
Physicians

Model 10:
Nurses

Model 11:
Dentists
-3.92**
(1.37)

Model 12:
Hospital
Beds
-0.72**
(0.20)

Model 13:
Inpatient
Admissions
0.08
(0.36)

Mass Privatization

-0.15*
(0.07)

-30.31
(16.32)

GDP

0.10
(0.07)

-44.31*
(18.61)

4.00**
(1.47)

0.22
(0.22)

2.05**
(0.41)

Urbanization

0.07**
(0.02)

18.21**
(5.23)

0.41
(0.42)

0.32**
(0.06)

0.74**
(0.11)

Dependency

-0.01
(0.01)

6.21*
(2.66)

0.70**
(0.22)

0.16**
(0.04)

0.11
(0.06)

Fertility

0.11
(0.11)

37.99
(23.81)

-1.89
(2.01)

1.53**
(0.33)

2.98**
(0.58)

Price Liberalization

-0.06
(0.03)

-18.40
(8.69)

1.24
(0.70)

-0.31**
(0.10)

-0.34
(0.19)

Education

0.00
(0.00)

0.81
(0.72)

0.16**
(0.06)

-0.01**
(0.00)

0.11**
(0.02)

Number of
Observations (NxT)

286

296

299

278

303

Number of
Countries (N)

26

25

25

26

26

R2
0.93
0.94
0.96
0.94
0.96
Note: Models 9 scaled per 1,000, Models 10-12 per 100,000, Model 13 per 100;
Constant not reported; Fixed Effects with country effects presented, period effects do
not alter results; Prais-Winsten transformation used to accommodate AR(1) error
structure; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 7. Endogenous Determinants of Mass Privatization

Covariate
log(GDP)
log(FDI)
log(IMF)
Urbanization
Dependency
Fertility
Education
Political Freedom
Price Liberalization
Years Central Planning
Ethnic Minority
FSU
CEEB

Probit†
0.43 (0.28)
-0.35 (0.35)
0.03 (0.02)
-0.04 (0.05)
0.09 (0.06)
-3.46 (0.99)**
-0.11 (0.03)**
-0.35 (0.20)
1.44 (0.25)**
0.04 (0.04)
1.48 (0.46)**
4.81 (1.10)**
0.77 (0.86)*

Probit ME†
0.08 (0.06)
-0.65 (0.61)
0.01 (0.00)
-0.01 (0.01)
0.02 (0.01)
-0.65 (0.25)**
-0.02 (0.01)**
-0.07 (0.04)
0.27 (0.10)**
0.01 (0.01)
0.28 (0.13)**
0.79 (0.14)**
0.17 (0.22)

LPM
0.02 (0.02)
-0.16 (0.63)
0.00 (0.00)
-0.00 (0.00)*
0.01 (0.01)
-0.23 (0.10)*
-0.01 (0.00)**
-0.04 (0.02)
0.16 (0.03)**
0.00 (0.00)
0.23 (0.04)**
0.79 (0.11)**
0.09 (0.08)

LPM (FEM)γ
-0.08 (0.07)
0.02 (0.45)
0.01 (0.00)**
-0.04 (0.02)*
0.03 (0.01)**
-0.28 (0.08)**
-0.01 (0.00)**
-0.08 (0.02)*
0.07 (0.03)*
-

Number of
Observations
Number of Countries
χ2
Pseudo-R2

313

313

313

313

26
196.83**
0.56

26
196.83**
0.56

26
184.85**
0.45

26
511.47**
0.83

Note: † - clustered standard errors for intra-group correlation; γ – Prais-Winsten transformation to
accommodate first-order autocorrelation; Discrete marginal effects given by ΔF/Δx = F(x1*β) - F(x0* β);
Continuous marginal effects evaluated at

x ; * = p<0.05; ** = p <0.01 (two-tailed t-test).

FDI is the logarithm of foreign direct investment per capita; IMF is the logarithm of International Monetary
Fund loans as a percent of total external loans; Ethnic Minority is the fraction of the population that is the
largest ethno-national minority stratified into three levels; Years Central Planning is the number years the
country was under central planning; Political Freedom is the Heritage Foundation political freedom
index; FSU and CEEB are dummies for whether the country is a member of the Former-Soviet Union or
Central and Eastern European Baltics.
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Table 8. Frequencies of Actual and Predicted Mass Privatization Experience,
Probit Model

Observations
Actual
0
1
Total

Predicted
0
198
24
222

1
14
77
91

Total
212
101
n = 313
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Table 9. Robustness Tests and Selection Models
Model Type

Coefficient on
Mass Privatization

Coefficient on
log (GDP)

Coefficient on
λ

R2

POLS
-1.79 (0.32)**
-0.33 (0.11)**
0.37
2SLS†
-1.17 (0.43)**
0.08 (0.16)
0.36
Treatment Effectsζ
-3.34 (0.40)**
-0.35 (0.11)**
1.55 (0.24)** 0.46
Random Effects†, ζ
-5.14 (0.53)**
0.37 (0.14)**
3.24 (0.33)** 0.62
Fixed Effects†,ζ
-0.91 (0.35)**
1.38 (0.24)**
0.04 (0.20)
0.94
Note: Models adjusted for EBRD price liberalization index, age-dependency ratio,
percentage of population urban, fertility rate, and percentage population with tertiary
education; † - Prais-Winsten transformation to accommodate AR(1) error structure; ζ standard errors adjusted for selection; * = p<0.05; ** = p<0.01 (two-tailed tests)
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Figure 1. Trends in Male Life Expectancy at Birth, 1960-2003.
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Figure 2. Infant Mortality Patterns in Russia, 1980-2002
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Figure 3. Neoliberal Economic and New Classical Sociological Theories of
Postcommunist Health Experience
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Appendix 1. Definitions of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Health Outcome
Life Expectancy
Male IHD
Female IHD
Male suicide
Female suicide
Male alcohol-related
mortality

Female alcoholrelated mortality
Policy Variables
Mass privatization
Log GDP
Political freedom
Price liberalization
Foreign Exchange &
trade liberalization
Years of central
planning
Foreign direct
investment
IMF credit/external
debt
Sociodemographic
Urbanization
Fertility
Dependency
Education
Ethnic Minority

Definition

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Life expectancy at birth
Deaths per 100,000 among working age
population (15-64) due to heart attacks
and coronary heart disease
Deaths per 100,000 among working age
population (15-64)
Deaths per 100,000 due to suicide and
other intentional causes of death
Deaths per 100,000 due to suicide and
other intentional causes of death
Deaths per 100,000 from combined,
selected causes of death known to relate
to alcohol. Includes alcohol-dependence
syndrome, liver cirrhosis, and chronic
liver disease
Previous for females

69.96
131.63

2.86
55.05

61.67
30.26

75.91
285.37

40.27

19.61

5.19

100.21

30.48

21.70

1.03

87.43

6.07

3.56

0.17

16.16

221.16

94.92

65.81

546.40

66.46

28.68

18.75

152.73

0 prior to implementation, 1 thereafter
Gross Domestic Product per capita,
current US $2000
Heritage Foundation Political Freedom
Index, from 1-7
EBRD Liberalization Index, scale of 14.3
EBRD Foreign Exchange Liberalization
Index, scale of 1- 4.3
Number of years under planned economic
regime
Log FDI as a percentage of GDP

0.32
23.11

0.47
1.47

0.00
20.38

1.00
26.97

3.55

1.99

1.00

7.00

3.15

0.93

1.00

4.30

3.15

1.24

1.00

4.30

56.72

13.08

41.00

74.00

0.28

0.37

-0.50

0.28

Percentage of IMF credit to external debt
level

8.80

10.67

0.00

53.56

Percentage of population living in urban
areas
Fertility rate (births per woman)
Percentage of population youth + elderly
Percentage tertiary enrollment
Percentage of population in secondlargest nationality; Country levels ordered
by thirds: 0, 1 and 2

56.70

12.44

25.13

75.20

1.85
53.85
23.38
0.80

0.75
10.60
12.04
0.88

1.07
39.49
2.60
0.00

5.04
88.33
69.30
2.00
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Appendix 1. Continued
Variable
Health Resources
Physicians
Nurses
Dentists
Hospital Beds
Bed Occupancy Rate
Inpatient Care

Description

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Number per 1,000 people
Number per 100,000 people
Number per 100,000 people
Number per 100,000 people
Hospital bed occupancy rate (%) in acute
care facilities
Inpatient care admissions per 100

3.05
680.54
33.66
8.49
73.17

0.85
229.58
22.45
2.68
14.98

1.28
143.40
1.20
3.02
25.60

5.19
1244.20
83.00
13.71
97.00

16.67

5.82

4.57

30.02

6.08

3.83

0.17

14.33

151.31

42.53

56.40

304.60

2831.23

393.64

3767.90

11.92

1.18

1675.1
0
9.37

Dietary and Nutritional Inputs
Alcohol
Pure alcohol consumption (liters per
Consumption
capita)
Fruit and Vegetable
Availability of fruits and vegetables (10
kgs)
Caloric Intake
Average number of calories available per
person per day
Protein
Percentage of total energy available from
protein

17.00
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Appendix 2a. Countries included in the full sample with number of observations
Country

Number
of Years
Observed
Albania
13
Armenia
12
Azerbaijan
11
Belarus
12
Bosnia
5
Bulgaria
14
Croatia
12
Czech Rep
13
Estonia
12
Georgia
12
Hungary
14
Kazakhstan
12
Kyrgyz Rep
12
Latvia
12
Lithuania
12
Macedonia, FYR 11
Moldova
12
Poland
14
Romania
14
Russia
14
Slovakia
10
Slovenia
12
Tajikistan
12
Turkmenistan
12
Ukraine
12
Uzbekistan
12
Total
313
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Appendix 2b. Estimates of country-specific fixed effects

Country-Specific Effects (αi)
Albania
6.92
Armenia
0.66
Azerbaijan
-4.46
Belarus
-2.69
Bosnia
8.55
Bulgaria
0.91
Croatia
4.35
Czech
-0.55
Estonia
-5.09
Hungary
-5.60
Kazakhstan
-8.62
Kyrgyzstan
0.96
Latvia
-0.22
Lithuania
0.64
Macedonia
3.46
Moldova
-0.64
Poland
-1.21
Romania
-1.93
Russia
-7.27
Slovakia
4.06
Slovenia
5.59
Tajikistan
2.14
Turkmenistan
3.59
Ukraine
-3.89
Uzbekistan
0.53
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Appendix 3. Lagged Dependent Variable Models
It has been shown that fixed effects estimators for lagged dependent variables (LDV) are
inconsistent as a result of correlation between the error term and the LDV (Nickel 1981).
We use the GMM system of Arellano and Bond (1991) which employs LDVs of 2nd and
higher orders to instrument for the endogenous lagged dependent variable, assuming
sequential exogeneity. Similar to the fixed effects approach, first-differences of the
dependent variable wipe out the random effect and are uncorrelated with the
contemporaneous error term.
Covariates
Mass Privatization
Mass Privatization (t-1)
Mass Privatization (t-2)
GDP
Urbanization
Dependency
Fertility
Price Liberalization
Education
Life Expectancy (t-1)

GMM one-stepγ
-0.62 (0.16)**
-0.51 (0.16)**
-0.08 (0.16)
0.60 (0.20)**
-0.03 (0.05)
0.17 (0.03)**
-0.34 (0.27)
-0.03 (0.09)
0.01 (0.01)
0.69 (0.06) **

GMM two-stepψ
-0.94 (0.34)**
-0.50 (0.74)**
-0.14 (0.46)**
0.34 (0.22)**
-0.01 (0.12)
-0.15 (0.06)**
-0.02 (0.01)*
-0.05 (0.07)
0.01 (0.01)
0.53 (0.21)*

Number of
261
261
Observations (N x T)
Number of Countries
26
26
(N)
AR(1)τ
0.00**
0.21
AR(2)τ
0.05**
0.18
2
**
Sargon Test (χ )
127.23
17.33
Note: Constant not reported; Fixed Effects with country effects
presented, period effects do not alter results; γ – White robust
covariance matrix; ψ – Arellano covariance matrix (1987); τ – pvalue for presence of AR disturbance; * = p<0.05; ** =
p<0.01 (two-tailed tests)

The first model finds evidence of directly positive state dependence that attenuates the
coefficients on the group of mass-privatization policy variables. Diagnostic tests find
evidence of overidentification and autocorrelation. The second model, which applies a
two-step method to better model the autocorrelation (ρ, not shown), produces a more
conservative estimate of the lagged dependent variable, but still significant at α=0.05.
The mass-privatization variables are jointly significant at the α=0.01 level. Under this
approach the model does not suffer from overidentification by instruments as indicated
by the Sargon test.

